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1 Introduction
In response to laments about administrative burdens and ‘reform fatigue’, many
university leaders have called for a prioritization of ‘internal quality assurance’ over
‘external quality control’.1 Already since 2003, the European University Associa-
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tion (EUA) has promoted “a coherent quality assurance (QA) policy for Europe,
based on the belief: that institutional autonomy creates and requires responsibility,
that universities are responsible for developing internal quality cultures and that
progress at European level involving all stakeholders is a necessary next step”
(EUA 2003, 9). Indeed, it would be strange if universities would not take this
responsibility, “since quality management, at least theoretically, can have potential
academic beneﬁts” (Pratasavitskayaa and Stensaker 2010, 3).
Underlying this idea is an implicit assumption that QA is in the best interest of
universities because it fosters the development of procedures and mechanisms
meant to ensure that “quality, however deﬁned and measured, is delivered” to the
stakeholders (Harvey and Green 1993, 19). By setting up QA processes, univer-
sities would show the larger public that quality in general and quality improvement
in particular is an ongoing concern for the governance of higher education insti-
tutions. Moreover, individual academics would continuously try to improve their
scientiﬁc work and teaching, in line with the needs of employers and students.
In this light, an interesting empirical question is to ask why most universities—
and indeed most professionals in higher education—do not internalize quality
assurance. In fact, we can ﬁnd quite a lot of resistance against this practice, both in
the academic literature and in practice (Apple 2005; Ball 2003). In Romania, the
topic has caught the attention of some scholarly debate, as universities are generally
considered to fail to internalize quality assurance (Păunescu et al. 2012). The
present paper asks why this is the case; in other words: why do Romanian uni-
versities not internalize quality assurance?
We address the question by drawing up ﬁve different hypotheses as to why
quality assurance is not internalized in Romanian universities. The hypotheses are
taken from the public policy literature as well as the literature on post-communist
transitions. They are then tested on empirical data consisting of national policy
documents on quality assurance and 187 semi-structured interviews with around
327 people (managers, faculty members, administrators and students) in 5 uni-
versities. After an analysis of the evidence, we argue that there are top-down
problems with the internalization of quality assurance, caused by ambiguous and
inconsistent national regulations focused on multilayered evaluation procedures. At
the same time, problems arise from the interpretation of quality assurance at lower
levels of decision-making. These hypotheses are then used to construct a narrative
of why Romanian universities fail to internalize quality assurance.
The paper proceeds as follows. It starts with a short background of the history of
QA in Romanian higher education, with an emphasis on difﬁculties encountered. In
order to explain problems in the internalization of QA, we then provide some
conceptual clariﬁcations on the notion of ‘quality assurance’ and the differences
between its ‘internal’ and ‘external’ variants. Next, we advance ﬁve hypotheses for
the failure to internalize QA in Romanian higher education institutions. After
presenting our research design, we put forward the analysis of our empirical data
and discuss its implications.
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2 Internal Quality Assurance in Romanian Universities—a
Mere Formality?
In the Romanian higher education system, QA exists as such since 2005, when the
government passed an Emergency Ordinance to comply with the ‘European Stan-
dards and Guidelines on Quality Assurance in Higher Education’ (2005). Before
this date, the idea of quality management was limited to the accreditation of higher
education institutions, regulated since 1993 in order to tackle the mushrooming of
the private sector—a common phenomenon in post-communist countries (Scott
2002). Throughout the 1990s, a National Council for Academic Evaluation and
Accreditation (CNEEA) was appointed by the Ministry of Education to run the
accreditation process, and focused on stafﬁng, infrastructure, management and
administration capacities (Păunescu et al. 2012, 317). The 2005 legislation created a
new autonomous public institution—the Romanian Agency for Quality Assurance
in Higher Education (ARACIS)—that took over the accreditation process and was
entrusted with responsibilities in the authorization of study programs and external
quality assurance more broadly. The law explicitly distinguished internal from
external quality assurance, and speciﬁc provisions focused on external evaluations
—deﬁned as “multi-criteria examinations of the extent to which a higher education
institution fulﬁlls the reference standards” (Emergency Ordinance 75/2005, Art 3
[2]). Accordingly, quality was to be ‘assured’ through “a set of activities meant to
develop the capacity of universities to elaborate, plan and implement study pro-
grams, thus gaining beneﬁciaries’ trust that the institution is maintaining quality
standards” (Ibid, Art 3[3]). More importantly however, external quality assurance
was linked with the accreditation of universities, upon which ARACIS was to
decide.
Since universities depended on ARACIS for their legal survival, they formally
complied with external requirements for quality assurance without necessarily
developing systems of their own (Vlăsceanu et al. 2011, 25). As a result, univer-
sities failed to consider internal quality assurance (IQA) as a managerial instrument
meant to enhance the quality of education (Păunescu et al. 2011, 30–31); instead,
they viewed it as an auxiliary bureaucratic procedure mentioned in the organiza-
tional chart but separated from the daily activities of teaching and learning in the
university. In the absence of a “local culture of quality” (Vlăsceanu et al. 2011, 26),
IQA was just another ‘empty-shell’ institution imported into the Romanian higher
education landscape, which came to be implemented without substantive effects.
But if QA were to have ‘substantive effects’ at the level of universities, how
would they look like? The next section reﬂects on this issue from a theoretical
perspective.
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3 Conceptual Notes on ‘Quality Assurance’
From an analytical point of view, we suggest that the problem with the lack of
substantive effects in the implementation of quality assurance stems from the fact
that universities only focus on ‘compliance’ with the rules imposed by QA policy,
without identifying with or believing in the underlying ideas behind it. More
speciﬁcally, academics in Romanian universities—for whatever reasons—do not
internalize the various policies and norms entailed in QA. Indeed, if all Romanian
academics would believe in the necessity of QA-related evaluation practices, we
would probably not be discussing this particular policy problem.2 The present
section expands on the issue of ‘internalization’ by explaining our understanding of
‘quality assurance’ and the normative connotations behind it.
What we mean with the concept of quality assurance is a variety of techniques
tasked with the evaluation of higher education and research with the purpose of
improving its quality. These practices have in common that they place a normative
appeal on ‘continuous self-improvement’ and ‘stakeholder communication’,
embedded in procedures that are subject to inspection by peers and/or professional
evaluators. The concept thus includes, among others, institutional evaluations, the
accreditation of study programs, or even league tables made by governmental
bodies. However, it probably does not cover managerial attitudes with a different
normative appeal (such as loyalty to superiors, or cut-throat competition with peers)
or evaluations of speciﬁc professional ‘products’ rather than the professional as
such (e.g. peer review in academic publishing). Nevertheless, it is perhaps not so
easy to draw clear boundaries around the technical and normative aspects of QA.
The concept has been controversial as to how it can best be adapted to higher
education, culminating in a variety of different approaches and terms. We thus see a
mushrooming of words like ‘audits’, ‘evaluations’, ‘reviews’ and ‘accreditations’
and a myriad of acronyms like ‘ESG’, ‘ISO’, ‘EFQM’, ‘PDCA-cycles’ or
‘TQM’3—each denoting different techniques of ‘doing QA’ as well as different
people involved in this practice.
While many debate the differences between these instruments, we think it is
important to analyze the shared ways of thinking behind them, their common
procedures and the interaction between their various forms. In this sense, we aim to
analyze the phenomenon that has sometimes been referred to as an ‘audit culture’
(Shore and Wright 1999; Strathern 2000) or even an ‘audit society’ (Power 1997).
2 Unless, of course, these policies would produce some unintended consequences. In that case, we
would probably turn around the question and ask why the academics are so eager to internalize the
policies.
3 These acronyms do not cover up any clear meaning. ‘ESG’ is used to denote the ‘European
Standards and Guidelines on Quality Assurance in the European Higher Education Area’; ‘EFQM’
stands for ‘European Foundation for Quality Management’ an organization that has promoted a so-
called ‘Excellence-model’ of quality assurance; ‘PDCA-Cycle’ stands for ‘Plan-Do-Check-Act-
Cycle’; Finally, ‘TQM’ stands for ‘Total Quality Management’.
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Analyzing the shared way of thinking behind these instruments is important,
because some common conceptual distinctions may not be as easy as they seem.
The distinction between ‘Internal Quality Assurance’ and ‘External Quality
Assurance’ is one chief example. The literature often makes this distinction,
whereby:
Internal quality assurance refers to those policies and practices whereby academic institu-
tions themselves monitor and improve the quality of their education provision, while
external quality assurance refers to supra-institutional policies and practices whereby the
quality of higher education institutions and programs is assured (Dill and Beerkens 2010, 4).
This distinction is relevant because one of the key reference documents, the
‘European Standards and Guidelines on Quality Assurance’, places the main
responsibility for QA on the shoulders of ‘higher education institutions’ (ENQA
2005). Indeed, the main policy documents in Romanian higher education make the
same distinction.4 But is it so easy to separate the ‘internal’ from the ‘external’? The
professional scholar, student or departmental coordinator can consider both types of
quality assurance as ‘external’. Inspectors with a mandate from the ‘state’ or from
the ‘rector’ may be equally insensitive to departmental standards and practices.
More importantly perhaps, both ‘external’ and ‘internal’ QA are the object of public
policy. Indeed, it is the purpose of much ‘external’ QA to analyze the functioning of
the ‘internal’ QA system. In other words, it is important to question whether
‘internal’ and ‘external’ can be disentangled so easily.
A second—and related—conceptual distinction is often made between quality
assurance for ‘accountability’ and for ‘improvement’, respectively. While the for-
mer notion emphasizes the control aspect of QA, the second emphasizes the
reﬂexive aspect (Bovens 2010). While this may seem a useful conceptual line, the
border is also hard to draw in practice. Even the hardest forms of control are often
justiﬁed through the language of improvement (Shore and Wright 1999). Therefore,
the relevant question to ask is: ‘accountability’ and ‘improvement’ for whom?
A speciﬁc change in teaching and learning methodology may be considered as an
improvement by the government, and at the same time as regress by professionals,
or vice versa.
In sum, then, the theoretical discussion on quality assurance requires us to
unpack distinctions and analyze what they mean for those involved in its various
practices. The following section will continue this discussion and propose various
reasons why Romanian universities do not internalize quality assurance.
4 This is at least the case for Emergency Ordinance 75/2005, the ARACIS Methodology, and Law
01/2011 on Education. These three texts can be considered as the reference texts on quality
assurance in Romanian higher education.
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4 Hypotheses on the Failure to Internalize Quality
Assurance
We present ﬁve possible hypotheses as to why quality assurance is not internalized
in Romanian higher education. The hypotheses are derived from public debates on
higher education as well as from public policy frameworks and political science
literature applicable to higher education. They are best understood as comple-
mentary to each other, even if there may be some apparent contradictions between
them. The following table gives a schematic overview over our hypotheses.
Although we probably cannot disprove any of them, we believe that the likelihood
of each hypothesis can be reduced if we do not ﬁnd any empirical evidence to
support it. Each hypothesis is discussed in more detail below with reference to what
type of empirical material we expect to ﬁnd (Table 1).
4.1 The Problem of Academic ‘Complacency’
The most straightforward explanation why quality assurance is not internalized is
because actors in universities do not see its purpose, since they are content with
what they are doing in terms of quality. The reasoning behind this argument
exhibits a form of academic ‘complacency’: people believe that they are good at
what they do, and as a result they do not think they need quality assurance (whether
external or internal). For instance, ARACIS considers that one of the main weak-
nesses of QA in Romania is that “higher education institutions still remain too ‘self-
laudatory’ instead of showing an understanding of the role of self-criticism concepts
for QA and the quality enhancement activities” (ARACIS Self-Evaluation Report
2013, p. 46).
Hypothesis 1: Quality assurance is not internalized because of academic
‘complacency’.
If this hypothesis holds empirical value, we should ﬁnd that people in univer-
sities are often self-praising about their activities while seldom reﬂecting critically
Table 1 A schematic overview over the hypotheses regarding the internalization of quality
assurance in Romanian universities
No. Hypothesis
H1 Quality assurance is not internalized because of academic ‘complacency’
H2 Quality assurance is not internalized because of ambiguous and inconsistent national
regulations
H3 Quality assurance is not internalized because it lacks support from people ‘on the ground’
H4 Quality assurance is not internalized because of institutional (communist) legacies from
the past
H5 Quality assurance is not internalized because the market does not reward its operation
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about themselves, their colleagues, or their university. Acknowledging weaknesses
is perceived as wrong or even ‘unethical’, especially if it relates to the activities of
others.
4.2 Top-Down Policy Failure
If the problem does not originate from complacency, then the failure to internalize
quality assurance might originate from the policies themselves. Top-down
approaches in implementation studies view the policy process as a linear model
wherein policy-makers specify straightforward policy objectives which are then put
into practice at lower levels (Palumbo and Calista 1990). The underlying
assumption is that actors at the top can control what happens in the implementation
chain (Elmore 1978; Mazmanian and Sabatier 1989). By implication, policy failure
can occur when central-level guidelines are not clear and consistent enough for
implementers to follow (Van Meter and Van Horn 1975).
Hypothesis 2: Quality assurance is not internalized because of ambiguous and
inconsistent national regulations.
If this hypothesis is correct, we expect to ﬁnd that people in universities regard
national frameworks on quality assurance as overregulated, difﬁcult to disentangle
for the purposes of implementation and changing too fast for them to have the
necessary time to adjust.
4.3 Bottom-up Policy Failure
A different, yet complementary perspective comes from the bottom-up approach in
implementation studies, which argues that policy results are ultimately dependent
on target populations and local deliverers (Berman 1978; Lipsky 1980; Matland
1995, 148–150). Accordingly, the success of a policy does not lie at the macro level
with the framing of legal requirements (which of course provide certain structures
of incentives), but at the micro level—where implementing actors need to be asked
about their problems, goals and activities in order to identify relevant policies and
ways to implement them (Hjern et al. 1978).
Hypothesis 3: Quality assurance is not internalized because it lacks support
from people ‘on the ground’.
If this hypothesis is accurate, then we should ﬁnd discordance between the
narratives at central level and those of actors inside universities. Importantly, we
should encounter actors in institutions who (at the very least) express skepticism
about the content and necessity of QA-related evaluation practices, suggesting that
national policies have little legitimacy or relevance on the ground.
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4.4 Problems in Overcoming ‘Legacies from the Past’
A prominent narrative in the transition literature in political science is that of
‘communist legacies’, which generally prevent people from adapting to new
approaches and mindsets (Kopstein 2003). In its more popularized form, this
‘legacy’ is a sort of vicious circle, with people distrusting each other, while the state
is not able or willing to engage with new institutional forms. In its more serious
form, ‘legacy’ is taken as a sociological type of institutional ‘path-dependence’
(Thelen and Steinmo 1992; Mahoney 2000) which deems the policy process as
incremental and overall resistant to change (Hall and Taylor 1996, 941). Bruszt and
Stark (1998), for instance, emphasize that the post-communist transition in Eastern
Europe consists of institutional innovations, although these are both enabled and
constrained by earlier political choices. In this sense, failure to absorb the new
institutional set-up is a function of both past failures and faulty design.
Hypothesis 4: Quality assurance is not internalized because of institutional
(communist) legacies from the past.
If such ‘path-dependence’ exists, we should ﬁnd dominant institutional forms
from the past that continue to inﬂuence actors today. In particular, we should ﬁnd
that academics refer to either formal or informal institutions with a long history that
are still prevalent in the university. We should ﬁnd that these institutions and
historical practices stand in competition or simply overshadow the implementation
of QA.
4.5 Logic of the Market for Higher Education
In contrast to theoretical frameworks focused on path-dependence stands a well-
known theory that emphasizes the logic of the market. Not only did post-socialist
countries democratize, but some also imported a speciﬁc type of capitalism, namely
neo-liberalism (Bohle and Greskovits 2012). Already in earlier discussions, some
scholars highlighted that new market arrangements could erase both old structures
and attempts at new institutional forms (Burawoy 2001). Although the market is
also a typical institution that is subject to path-dependence, we think it warrants a
separate hypothesis. The difference with ‘path-dependence’ is that the market is not
so much a ‘past-dependence’, as a ‘future-dependence’ which inﬂuences operations
in the present based on the actors’ cost-beneﬁt analysis (ibid).
Consequently, the market may both inhibit and encourage quality assurance
practices depending on the individual preferences of actors (i.e. higher education
institutions, students, professors, employers, etc.). On the one hand, the market may
value less traditional academic standards of quality, while rewarding only the
qualiﬁcations of graduates, which can lead to the cheap milling of diplomas. On
the other hand, since the concept of quality management was pioneered in industry,
the market may encourage a constant concern with quality assurance. Since we are
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concerned with answering why QA is not internalized, we will only discuss the
former interpretation of the argument.
Hypothesis 5: Quality assurance is not internalized because the market does not
reward its operation.
If this hypothesis holds empirical value, we expect to ﬁnd that members of the
university community do not perceive the market to reward quality assurance5.
Moreover, the internalization of QA should be perceived by these same actors as
‘not worth the time and money’. Instead, their perception would be that the market
rewards other type of activities, like popular study programs with little substance.
Having outlined the possible explanations for the failure to internalize QA in
Romanian universities, the next sections move to presenting the data and the main
ﬁndings. Before that, some elements of research design are introduced.
5 Research Design
From a methodological standpoint, our research follows in the tradition of inter-
pretive policy analysis, exploring both discourses and the effects of ideas on
practices (Fischer and Forester 1993; Finlayson et al. 2004). Within this framework,
the purpose was to understand how actors in universities engage with quality
assurance in terms of activities, effects and meanings associated with it (Milliken
1999). To this end, we examined three dimensions: (a) what is being done at the
university/faculty level under the heading ‘Quality Assurance’; (b) what these
activities lead to, and (c) how actors relate to this process.
In order to investigate how people “make sense of their lived experiences”
(Yanow 2007, 410) with quality assurance, we used two primary methods - namely
interviews and document analysis. Five ﬁeld visits were carried out between
December 2012 and May 2013 to a representative sample6 of universities: the West
University of Timisoara (UVT), the Babes Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca
(UBB), the Gheorghe Asachi Technical University (TUI) in Iasi, the Romanian
American University (RAU) in Bucharest and the Lucian Blaga University (LBU)
in Sibiu. During the visits (which followed a standard template), we conducted 187
5 Of course, it is also possible that the market rewards a speciﬁc type of QA. In this case, we
would expect to ﬁnd that actors in universities will use it strategically to respond to market needs.
6 The sample ensured geographical variation, as well as variation between different types of
university proﬁles (comprehensive/technical) and sizes (large universities with over 20,000
students, and smaller universities with less than 10,000 students). A private university (RAU) was
included in the sample in order to avoid an overemphasis on public universities. For individual
interviews, faculty members and students were selected by the administration of universities.
Although this process was probably not entirely random, care was taken to visit as many faculties
as possible (usually 2–4 faculties with various departments). This selection had a predictable effect
—those who were selected being more likely to have internalized QA more strongly, or at least to
be more aware of discussions on the topic. In other words, the ﬁndings will probably have a
positive bias (Dillman et al. 2009).
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semi-structured interviews with a cross-section of the university population -
including management in rectorates and faculties, QA commissions and depart-
ments, individual professors, and students (327 people in total). All interviews were
transcribed, allowing for a structured analysis of transcripts. We then constructed a
database on quality assurance in Romania, consisting of national-level policy
documents in conjunction with documents originating from universities (institu-
tional reports on QA) and the interview data. Each document was analyzed with a
similar coding procedure used in the computer program ‘Atlas.TI’.7 Inter-code
reliability was ensured through a shared list of codes and mutual evaluations of
coding practices. The coded material was later examined in light of the alternative
hypotheses proposed. The ﬁndings are presented in the next section.
6 Findings
Table 2 below presents a concise summary of our ﬁndings. As shown in the table,
hypotheses 2 and 3 were conﬁrmed by the evidence gathered, while we did not ﬁnd
any support for hypotheses 1, 4 and 5.
The empirical evidence thus goes against some of the dominant explanations for
why universities fail to internalize quality assurance. Although we cannot deﬁnitely
reject hypotheses 1, 4 and 5, we have not found enough empirical material to
support them. In fact, when it comes to hypothesis 1, we often encountered the
opposite situation: rather than being complacent, most interviewees manifested
insecurity about their professional status and awareness of the gaps in their ‘sci-
entiﬁc’ work, coupled with an evident desire for self-improvement. In a similar vein
- in relation to hypotheses 4 and 5 - we discovered that quality assurance is not
directly inhibited by ‘communist legacies’, but instead seems to be encouraged by
market mechanisms. Indeed, the university that was most dependent on the market
(the private one) had strongly internalized the improvement values associated with
quality assurance.
Clearly, there is no single mechanism at play that prevents QA from being
internalized in Romanian universities. The two hypotheses conﬁrmed by empirical
evidence are thus complementary rather than mutually exclusive—as such, we will
aim to construct a narrative in which hypotheses 2 and 3 provide a ‘full story’ of the
reasons why QA is not internalized. The heart of the problem, according to our
data, lies in the nature of policy-making in Romanian higher education—which
fails in both its top-down and bottom-up dimensions. On the one hand, policy
failure originates from unclear and inconsistent legal provisions that only result in a
bewildering array of evaluation procedures and administrative structures considered
burdening by actors in universities. On the other hand, policy failure derives from
7 This coding process, as well as the resulting database is available (in anonymized form) for
further research upon written request to the researchers.
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the exclusion of lower-level actors from decision-making on QA policy; as a result,
these actors feel no ownership over their IQA systems. On the contrary, they regard
quality assurance as a tool of the government, imposed from above, with the
purpose to control universities through various reporting mechanisms. As a form of
passive dissent, they comply with QA requirements in a ritualistic manner - which
is why the process fails to produce substantive quality enhancements.
Based on an initial analysis of empirical evidence for each hypothesis in turn, we
constructed a narrative8 as to why Romanian universities fail to internalize QA. In
line with hypotheses 2 and 3, we present the ‘story’ below.
6.1 Top-Down Problems
The account starts at the macro level, with the design of national policies on quality
assurance and higher education more broadly. Probably the most serious problem of
the Romanian higher education system, as resulting from our data, comes from the
unstable policy environment—higher education policies change very frequently,
and so do procedures to ensure quality. Universities do not have a consistent set of
rules to follow on QA and other activities in general, which creates confusion (since
it is difﬁcult to keep up-to-date with the latest legislative modiﬁcations) and pre-
vents them from engaging in long-term planning. While the law on quality assur-
ance has remained more or less in place since 2005, there have been many
subsequent legal changes following the 2011 law on education, the classiﬁcation
exercise and associated legislation related to the evaluation of research centers
(UEFISCDI 2010). Each of these changes has led to a build-up of frustrations about
quality assurance and its supposed remedies among many academics. As expressed
by one professor:
Regulations are constantly changing and it is hard to follow up on them. Some of the
regulations are not coherent. We are constantly on stand-by. This creates confusion and we
cannot plan for the future. (Decision-Maker, Professor, Female, NS0302).
The back-and-forth with the national classiﬁcation system, whose legal status
remains unclear9, was an oft-cited example of policy instability affecting the
implementation chain. Speciﬁc to internal quality assurance, recent legislation
8 In interpretive policy analysis, narratives are stories “participants are disposed to tell about
policy situations” (Fischer and Forester 1993, 11) in an attempt to make sense of a socially
constructed world. They play a key role in problem deﬁnition, providing “a view of what has to be
done and what the expected consequences will be” (Fischer 2003, 161).
9 The hierarchization of study programs, whose legal basis lies in Ministerial Order no. 4174/
13.05.2011, was a controversial measure introduced to classify higher education institutions in
Romania according to teaching and research capacities and subsequently determine their ﬁnancing.
The funding effects of the classiﬁcation were overturned by Emergency Ordinance 21/2012 and a
university in Suceava even won an appeal case against the Ministry on the matter (2013). The
classiﬁcation as such still stands legal, without implications for ﬁnancing.
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obliged universities to separate QA commissions operating under the rector from
curriculum and quality commissions at the Senate level, which was criticized by
implementing actors as overlapping and counterproductive because they are
sometimes doing the same thing (Decision-Maker,10 Professor, Male, AM0102).
Since neither the law nor the methodology speciﬁes the boundaries of QA,
people tend to understand it according to their own agenda. For instance, managers
at faculty level would often link QA with the enforcement of sanctions on their
employees. In the absence of ﬂexible labor legislation, some university managers
claimed that they would like to use staff evaluations for command-and-control
purposes, e.g. to ﬁre people (Decision-Maker, Professor, Male, AM0203). While
QA may very well have the role to keep track of professors’ teaching and research
activities, it can probably not substitute legal requirements on proper academic
conduct. IQA may be the wrong tool to prevent violations of professional standards
such as academic corruption, unmotivated absence from classes or deﬁance of basic
student rights. This is where labor and even criminal law is supposed to come into
effect. As one interviewee put it:
We have moved from quality evaluation to quality control - this does not mean quality
improvement exactly (Decision-Maker, Professor, Male, AM0202).
In addition, the legal framework on QA is not straightforward to implement. For
example, the ARACIS methodology emphasizes the production of documents
outlining procedures rather than substantive performance indicators on teaching and
learning. As one interviewee noticed:
Many of the things discussed on QA at ARACIS or the university level are empty of any
content. For example, there is little in the way of ARACIS criteria that checks if teaching is
suitable and relevant for the departments concerned. There is also little in the way of
checking what actually happens in the classroom. It is important to check facts, not paper
reports (Decision-Maker, Professor, Female, RS0802).
Although the legislation aims for the enhancement of quality by reference to
numerous ‘standards’ and ‘procedures’, it is far from clear what they are supposed
to achieve in terms of teaching and learning outcomes. Moreover, since universities
rarely have QA-trained people to understand and apply the technical language from
the national level, it is hard for them to identify with QA activities.
Another macro-level problem refers to the requirement to establish several
administrative structures layered on top of each other. Typically, an institution
would have at university level a QA department (DMC) and a QA commission
(University-CEAC)—both operating under the supervision of a vice-rector
responsible for quality management. These structures are complemented by a
department on scientiﬁc research (under the supervision of another vice-rector) and
10 In our coding, ‘Decision-Makers’ include: rectors, vice-rectors, deans, vice-dean, heads of
department, senate members, senate/university-level CEAC; ‘Administrators’ are people working
in Quality Assurance Departments or Faculty-level CEACs; ‘Professors/Associate Professors/
Lecturers/Assistant Professors’ are academics not holding any hierarchical or QA-related position,
whereas ‘Students’ can be undergraduate or postgraduate (both MA and PhD).
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a Senate commission on curriculum and quality. At faculty level, there are quality
assurance and evaluation commissions (Faculty-CEAC), usually headed by the
dean or a vice-dean tasked with quality management. Within departments, speciﬁc
people are sometimes appointed as QA responsible, but usually the tasks fall under
the role of department heads. While all these structures are theoretically part of an
integrated system, the relationship between them does not seem entirely clear to
many interviewees. Usually, the Quality Assurance Department is the most active
structure at university level, but the degree to which QA procedures are organized
and followed up at faculty level is largely dependent on individual managerial
initiatives.
Owing to such complex institutional structures, there is a tendency to multiply
procedures that are not always needed. Does the Senate really have to be involved
in evaluating programs before ARACIS visits? Do faculties and departments really
have to operationalize the strategic plan each year, and produce a report on their
activities? There is a lot of frustration about the level of bureaucratization involved
in running the IQA system:
[We need] to stop working twice for the same thing. Why do I need to have a faculty report
and a QA report? Are they not the same thing? Why do we need two different reports and
formats? (Decision-Maker, Professor, Male, RS0503).
Time management needs to become better. We are wasting a lot of time on useless
things” (Decision-Maker, Lecturer, Male, KG0705).
The QA process is characterized by huge quantities of bureaucratic requirements. We
are lucky that the Vice-Dean for Quality Management takes care of these documents”
(Decision-Maker, Professor, Male, RS0604).
So far, the narrative presented reﬂects top-down aspects of the problems to
internalize quality assurance. But our data shows that even if the national regu-
lations would have been perfectly clear and consistent, they may not have been
applied on the ground. There are signiﬁcant bottom-up elements to consider, and
they are presented next.
6.2 Bottom-up Problems
Most signiﬁcantly, our data suggests that members of the university community do
not feel ownership over their IQA systems. Since there are direct links between
external evaluations and the legal survival of universities, respondents seem to
understand IQA as preparation for external inspection rather than internal reﬂection
on teaching and learning:
The QA system was only created in response to the law and ARACIS requirements - there
is no point to hide this fact (Decision-Maker, Associate Professor, Male, AM1201).
We are forced by all these different institutions, ARACIS, EUA, to do such evaluations
(Decision-Maker, Professor, Male, AM0202).
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This understanding highlights that IQA is implemented mainly to comply with
the law and governmental regulations rather than to actually improve institutional
quality. In this sense, QA is viewed as something imposed from the outside,
through procedures meant to artiﬁcially create a ‘quality culture’. But since the
focus is on reporting (externally), the IQA system is regarded as a tool of gov-
ernment designed to control universities by invoking the argument of accountability
—which is perceived especially by university and faculty management as infringing
upon university autonomy. Further in the implementation chain, there is no wonder
that people react strategically:
We were even told from the university level: you do what you think is best, and don’t take
the self-evaluation too seriously (Associate Professor, Male, AM0502).
Accordingly, people passively try to subvert this tool of government by carrying
it out in a ritualistic fashion while hiding what they are really doing. Instead of open
contestation, there is a sort of resignation and task avoidance, which is why QA
cannot become internalized. For instance, most respondents believe that evaluation
criteria are imposed from above by policy-makers with little experience in running a
university:
The system is designed by bureaucrats who have never been in a university. Now this
system meets the everyday reality of people who try to cope (Lecturer, Male, NS0902).
Universities need to be autonomous. (…) they need to be free to set their own path to
excellence rather than being constrained by excessive regulation from the central level
(Decision-Maker, Associate Professor, Female, RS0105).
Many problems are derived from here. One interviewee referred to the difﬁculty
to comply with the recently-imposed research standards, given both the lack of
resources (e.g. access to international databases) and expertise to conduct research
at a European level. The unintended effect was that research quality probably
decreased as a result:
[Research indicators] have asked us to become ‘writing machines’. Books are written like
this (snaps ﬁngers) without reﬂecting on what should be written (Administrator, Assistant
Professor, Female, KG0905).
I take information from students diploma projects. I give them some research to do, and
I maybe get some papers from the research. It is maybe not so good, but both the student
and I gain from this. (Associate Professor, Male, KG0503)
Simultaneously, assessment procedures do not account for differences between
disciplines and ﬁelds of research. For example, in technical ﬁelds manuals are in
great demand because of the fast-changing nature of the disciplines; however, their
production is not counted as research (Decision-Maker, Associate Professor, Male,
AM1003).
Moreover, QA procedures are often perceived as disconnected from the actual
problems and goals universities have:
QA is not related to the improvement of quality: there has never been a bottom-up debate
on what it should entail (Postgraduate Student, Male, AM0701).
Why Do Romanian Universities Fail … 57
For the average academic, QA has little utility in generating any type of change
unless there is a personal desire for self-improvement. Without the connection
between QA procedures and quality improvement, many academics see the QA
process as purposeless and only taking important time from their teaching and
research activities:
I was tormented years in a row by all this paperwork [for ARACIS evaluations]; when
should you have time for research when you have all these additional tasks? (Lecturer,
Male, AM1301).
In the language of the bottom-up implementation literature, this discussion can
be summarized by claiming that local implementers (individual academics) do not
see IQA as responding to their institutional needs and goals, their understandings of
quality and how this should be achieved. Although there are individual exceptions,
IQA thus fails to produce the quality improvements stated as objective.
7 Conclusion and Discussion
Despite being wrapped in a technical, enhancement-driven discourse, the discussion
on the internalization of quality assurance is in fact as multifaceted as it is politi-
cally sensitive. This paper has demonstrated that there is no straightforward way to
understand why actors in universities fail to routinize QA practices in their activities
and subsequently use them to generate quality improvements, since the mechanisms
at play are manifold. The analysis of the Romanian case has shown that problems
revolve around the process of policy-making, with underlying causes at both the
macro level (top-down failure) and the micro level (bottom-up failure). Indeed, the
inconsistency and ambiguity of national regulations—not linked to teaching and
learning in any substantive way - determine actors in universities to feel burdened
by QA and confused as to how they should implement and make use of its
activities. Moreover, there is some discordance between central-level narratives
focused on quality enhancement and accountability and those of actors in univer-
sities, who generally feel no ownership over their IQA systems and fail to see the
purpose of the multiple evaluation procedures. Therefore, actors on the ground
reject QA practices as unnecessary and infringing upon university autonomy, which
is why they subsequently perform them in a superﬁcial manner—as a form of
passive dissent. In the end, there can be no talk of improving QA processes in the
Romanian higher education system without direct involvement and support from
the people for whom they are effectively designed.
In light of the conceptual clariﬁcations presented earlier in this paper, our
ﬁndings may appear less surprising. Undeniably, it is difﬁcult to separate the
‘internal’ from the ‘external’ when it comes to quality assurance. Academics are
inclined to perceive all evaluations as ‘external’, regardless if they are conducted by
governmental agencies/international bodies or their own institutions. At the same
time, professional evaluators may miss the speciﬁcities of individual departments
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and disciplines, touching upon the sensitivities of local actors who thus become less
open to move beyond ritualistic compliance with QA requirements. The issue hence
returns to the second conceptual element mentioned, namely for whom is QA
supposed to produce ‘accountability’ and ‘improvement’? For individual academics
in the universities that we visited, the answer is ‘not for us’. On the contrary, the
government is seen as the main beneﬁciary of all evaluation procedures, followed
perhaps by the university management to a lesser extent. As long as they don’t see it
in their best interest, actors in universities have no motivation to internalize quality
assurance—which as a result fails to deliver on the promised quality enhancement
objective.
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in
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